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Inclusion or Dualization? The Political Economy of Employment Relations in 
Italian and Greek Telecommunications 
 
Recent literature argues that trade unions in restructuring service industries have 
responded to the challenges of the post-industrial era by accepting different forms of 
labour market dualization. This article examines two case studies from Italy and 
Greece, in which unions adopted divergent responses to intensified market pressures 
unleashed by the liberalization of national telecommunications markets. In the Italian 
case, collective bargaining was successfully centralized, resulting in the inclusion of 
traditional labour market ‘outsiders’. In contrast, bargaining centralization failed in 
Greek telecommunications, leading to intensified dualization. These different paths of 
institutional change are explained as resulting from differences in ideological 
cleavages among unions and distinct legacies in employers’ associations. 
 




Recent literature on institutional change in coordinated market economies focuses on 
common trends of labour market dualization, in which encompassing bargaining is 
eroded in favour of more narrow systems preserving institutional protections for 
traditional ‘insider’ groups. The global intensification of competition and shifts in 
employment from manufacturing to services have been broadly associated with more 
selfish union behaviour. Employers sought to encourage labour market deregulation 
as a response to increased competitive pressures. However, the outcomes of 
dualization are often attributed to the institutional reforms that were engineered by 
coalitions of trade unions with (social democratic) governments (Davidsson and 
Emmenegger 2013; Hassel 2014; Palier and Thelen 2010). According to this 
literature, unions tolerated dualization in services to protect their core membership in 
established industries. A related body of social pacts literature outlines the conditions 
that facilitated the reform of labour markets (Avdagic 2010; Baccaro and Lim 2007). 
These scholars argue, along similar lines, that trade unions consented to reforms 
towards greater labour market flexibility so that they could retain their institutional 
role in the policy-making process.  
 
The present article departs from these analyses’ focus on the conditions under which 
different coalitions of interests result in intensified dualization. Instead, it examines 
the conditions that may enable an alternative path of coalitions that temper labour 
market dualization by bringing outsider groups under the protective umbrella of 
collective bargaining. In addition, contrary to the social pacts literature that has 
focused on unions’ concessions at the national level, it seeks to understand the 
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conditions that enable the establishment of inclusive bargaining institutions at the 
sector level.  
 
In liberalized services sectors, such as telecommunications, this outcome appears least 
likely due to intense market pressures. Across Europe, telecommunications unions 
faced the challenge of either accepting labour market dualization or establishing new 
sectoral bargaining structures to integrate outsider groups working for new 
competitors and their subcontractors (Doellgast et al. 2009; Doellgast 2009; 
MacKenzie 2009). This has been particularly challenging in a sector where there is 
one big former monopolist with different regulatory and labour cost interests to new 
competitors. The leading case of this article focuses on the centralization of 
bargaining in the Italian telecommunications industry, which extended coverage to 
outsiders and tempered dualization. This presents a puzzle, as based on dualization 
theory we would expect liberalization to intensify the cleavages between insiders and 
outsiders. I seek to explain this outcome, with a view to answering the question: under 
what conditions are unions and employers able to overcome differences in interests, 
and form the coalitions necessary to establish centralized bargaining? The empirical 
puzzle is constructed in tandem with the Greek telecommunications case, which faced 
similar pressures, but in which dualization intensified. Although, similar to Italy, 
Greece has a centralised bargaining system at the national level, the Greek 
telecommunications sector retained a decentralised bargaining structure.  
 
The comparison between these two cases helps to shed light on the conditions that 
may explain different trajectories of institutional change at sector level, within similar 
national models. It is argued that the observed variation is explained not only by the 
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different strategic choices made by trade unions, which are traced to the different role 
of ideology, but also by the variable institutional legacies in employer’s associations, 
which offered different capacities to intermediate the diverse business interests. 
 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The following section reviews 
the relevant political economy literature on dualization and social pacts, as well as the 
employment relations’ literature on the telecommunications industry, specifying the 
conditions under which previous literature would predict dualization or centralization. 
The third section outlines the research design and data sources for this study. The 
fourth section places the cases in their wider institutional and historical context at the 
national and sectoral level. This historical perspective helps to tease out the role of 
path-dependent factors in explaining the different outcomes in the two cases. In the 
fifth section, the narrative traces the process of change, outlining the pressures from 
liberalization and privatization, and shows how the interplay between actors’ strategic 
choices and institutional legacies shaped distinct paths of change. The final section 
interprets the diverse outcomes using a historical perspective and clarifies the 
contribution of this article to recent debates. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. The Political Economy of Institutional Change: Dualization and Social Pacts 
Much of the literature on institutional change in advanced economies tries to explain 
variation in patterns of institutional erosion and deregulation at the nation-state level 
(Hall and Thelen 2009; Howell and Givan 2011). The global intensification of 
competition and the shift in employment structures towards services provided 
pressures for institutional convergence, but commentators agree that wholesale 
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liberalization was averted in non-liberal market economies (Hassel 2014: 76; Howell 
and Givan 2011: 250). In coordinated market economies, employers’ interest in 
flexibilizing labour markets is highlighted as the trigger of structural shifts. However, 
the outcomes of dualization are often attributed to coalitions between trade unions and 
social democratic parties, as both sought to defend their core members and key 
political constituencies (Hassel 2014: 70; Palier and Thelen 2010: 127). The consent 
of trade unions to reforms towards greater labour market flexibility was generally 
exchanged for the maintenance of their organizational resources and their institutional 
role in the policy-making process (Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013: 341).  
 
A related body of social pacts literature outlined the conditions that facilitated these 
shifts in labour market regulation. Interestingly, the institutional changes that took the 
form of national social pacts represented the simultaneous centralization of bargaining 
and dualization of labour markets. The literature on social pacts fleshed out the 
conditions that led to the neo-corporatist revival, pinpointing the role of electorally 
weak governments (Avdagic 2010: 630; Baccaro and Lim 2007: 30; Hamann and 
Kelly 2007: 975), a shared sense of a crisis (Avdagic 2010: 631), and moderate union 
leadership (Baccaro and Lim 2007: 38). While our argument takes up these conditions 
as important for national social pacts, it suggests that they are unable to fully explain 
inclusive bargaining institutions at the sector level. This analysis often excludes the 
role and structures of employers, because their interests are largely taken as given in 
the form of pressures from globalization and international competition. Martin and 
Swank (2012) emphasised the role of encompassing peak employers’ associations in 
the construction of welfare and skill-formation systems in coordinated market 
economies. Nevertheless, employers’ potential support for national institutions that 
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provide skills or unemployment insurance is markedly different from their potential to 
support sectoral bargaining agreements. That is because the former produce ‘win-win’ 
outcomes, whereas the latter are placed at the heart of the distributive conflict. 
 
In the past, collective bargaining could be seen as a ‘win-win game’ and employers 
generally cooperated with these arrangements, as long as it provided a degree of 
market control by taking wages ‘out of competition’ while reducing transaction costs 
(Marginson et al. 2003: 164). Centralized bargaining stabilized and standardized 
labour costs across an industry, especially under conditions of labour scarcity. 
Additionally, the institution maximized employers’ bargaining power in dealing with 
trade unions’ mobilization and protected them from any ‘whipsawing’ tactics 
(Zagelmeyer 2005: 1627).  
 
In recent years, the integration of product markets and the intensification of 
competition has reshuffled the cards on the table (Marginson et al. 2003: 165), 
contributing to a trend towards decentralization of bargaining across industrialised 
countries (Katz et al. 2004). Firms’ interest in keeping a floor on wages through 
bargaining agreements appeared to be weakening, as persistent unemployment 
allowed downward pressure on wages. Additionally, reforms of labour market 
regulation towards more flexibility enabled firms to respond to demand fluctuations 
through strategic use of labour market segmentation. At the same time, trade unions in 
established industries could accept some dualization in their sectors as long as this 
acted as a ‘flexibility buffer’ to their core members (Benassi and Dorigatti 2014: 18). 
There is perhaps no other industry that better reflects those shifts brought by 
globalization and international competition than the telecommunications industry. The 
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next section considers the employment relations’ literature on the diversity of 
responses in telecommunications. 
 
2.2. Employment Relations in Telecommunications Industries 
The telecommunications industry is exemplary of a ‘double blow’, whereby 
regulatory and ownership change coincided with technological change (Sako and 
Jackson 2006: 347). In liberal market economies the path of dualization and 
decentralised bargaining in this sector is not surprising as it follows national trends. 
For instance, the Australian telecommunications sector oscillated between company 
agreements in Telstra and non-union individual contracts in its competitors (Ross and 
Bamber 2009: 35–39). Even in the case of Ireland, which experienced a resurgence of 
social partnership at the national-level up until the crisis (Doherty 2011), there was no 
attempt to centralize bargaining in telecommunications (MacKenzie 2009: 547).  
 
More surprisingly, there has been a wide variation of union responses in coordinated 
market economies. In Germany, the conglomerate union ver.di attempted to centralize 
bargaining at sector level, but it was unable to do so (Doellgast 2009: 8; Holst 2014: 
10–12). In some countries, such as Denmark and Austria, a sectoral agreement was 
established; however, its coverage was often variable (Doellgast et al. 2013: 13). In 
France, the state supported collective bargaining centralization via mandatory 
extension of agreements (Doellgast et al. 2009: 375). Overall, the institutional paths 
in the global and European telecommunications industry appeared diversified (Batt et 
al. 2009: 468–469; Doellgast et al. 2013). This literature emphasized how the 
historical construction of interests and past collective bargaining structures hampered 
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unions’ ability to shape inclusive bargaining institutions (Doellgast 2009; Doellgast et 
al. 2013; Holst 2014). 
 
The present article suggests that - in addition to past bargaining structures - the role of 
ideology is an important factor in the construction of interests and the strategic choice 
of unions to either pursue inclusion of outsiders or accept dualization. It also 
contributes to these debates by examining institutional contexts that are categorically 
different from either coordinated or liberal market economies. Italy and Greece 
represent cases of ‘State-influenced Market Economies’ in which the role of the state 
remains important in the economy (Schmidt 2008), even after its withdrawal from 
ownership and regulation of particular industries. Finally, it emphasises the role of 
past institutional legacies in employers’ structures as an independent condition. The 
next section elaborates on the research design of this study. 
 
3. Research Design and Data Sources 
The article is structured as a comparative and historical case study (Mahoney 2004). 
The case selection is purposive and theoretically motivated, and the Italian and Greek 
telecommunications sectors are chosen because they represent similar cases with 
different outcomes. The two cases share initial starting points, since both countries’ 
telecommunications sectors started in the early 1990s as state-owned monopolies, 
with traditions of strong unions and company-level bargaining. The industries opened 
up to competition due to the European Union’s liberalization policy. The change in 
the market context represented a similar challenge to unions and employers in both 
sectors, and the entrance of new competitors resulted in a diversity of contractual 
arrangements and segmentation practices. Nonetheless, the institutional paths with 
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respect to collective bargaining centralization differed sharply. This suggests that 
extreme selection bias is avoided, because the selection allows ‘for at least some 
variation on the dependent variable’ (King et al. 1994: 129). The overall timeframe of 
the case studies considers the period between 1995 and 2008. The narrative sketches 
the common pressures coming from intensified competition in the market and 
ownership change through privatization. The case studies suggest that there is co-
variation between explanatory factors and outcomes.  
 
The case studies in this article rely on secondary sources and 18 key informant 
interviews that ranged from one hour to three hours in length. The key informants 
included representatives from Italian and Greek sectoral and national trade unions, 
business associations, the political arena, as well as industry experts. Field visits took 
place in Rome (May and November 2010) and in Athens (April-May and August 
2011). Most of the interviews were tape-recorded, following oral consent, and a 
commitment to quote anonymously. The interview instrument was a semi-structured 
protocol with open questions. The validity and credibility of data from interviews was 
enhanced via triangulation. Thus, the case studies rely also on a wide range of 
documents, including European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) reports, 
European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR) articles, as well as Italian and Greek 
newspaper articles. In the case that the source is written in a language other than 
English, the translation is the author’s. 
 
4. The Institutional and Historical Context 
4.1. The national institutional context in Italy and Greece 
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The Italian and Greek systems of employment relations shared some important 
similarities that relate to the framework governing collective bargaining agreements 
and the historically ideological nature of trade unionism. Still, the two systems 
differed in the institutional structure of employers associations, while trade unions’ 
ideological character evolved differently. 
 
In particular, the resurgence of concertation in Italy started with the signing of the 
July 1993 Accord. The signatories included the three major union confederations 
(CGIL, CISL, UIL), the major employers’ associations, including Confindustria, and 
the ‘technocratic’ government of Carlo Ciampi. The Accord reformed the collective 
bargaining framework, introducing a two-tier system: nation-wide sectoral bargaining 
and a second level of bargaining at the company or territorial level (Regalia and 
Regini 2004). The tripartite Accord of 1993 was followed by an era of concertation, 
which made Italy an exemplary case of ‘a new kind of corporatism’ (Baccaro and 
Pulignano 2011: 139).  
 
The framework governing collective bargaining was similarly reformed in the Greek 
system of employment relations via Law 1876/1990. The 1990 coalition government, 
known as ‘ecumenical’, enacted the law with support from the peak labour 
confederation (GSEE) as well as the three major employers’ associations (SEV, 
GSEVEE, ESEE). Thus, it is considered as equivalent to a social pact due to the wide-
ranging support it enjoyed (Ioannou 2010). The main thrust of this Law formally 
introduced two levels of bargaining, nation-wide sectoral and a second level of 
bargaining at the company level. Finally, biennial national collective bargaining 
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setting minimum wages operated as a ‘functional equivalent’ to social concertation 
(Karamessini 2008: 49). 
 
Additionally, the role of ideology played an important part in both Italian and Greek 
trade unionism. In Italy, the three main union confederations (CGIL, CISL, and UIL), 
had historically a strong dependence on political parties (collateralismo) (Vatta 2007: 
207). CGIL was linked to the Communists; CISL linked to the Catholic/Christian 
Democrats; and UIL linked to the Socialists (Regalia and Regini 2004). In Greece, the 
representation of labour was unitary, with one peak union confederation (GSEE). 
Nonetheless, the ideological cleavages were internal, organised along competing 
union factions (PASKE linked with the socialists, DAKE linked with the centre-right 
party, PAME linked to the communist party). Political union factionalism in Greece 
survives up until today, however, the ideological divisions in Italy’s unions faded out 
over time. 
 
The most important rupture with the past was a result of the political scandals in the 
early 1990s known as ‘Tangentopoli’. The traditional Italian political parties went 
into disrepute, and this contributed considerably to the breaking up of the organic 
links between the three major con-federal unions and the old political parties. The 
unions did not develop formal links with the new parties that entered the political 
arena. As a result, the acute political differences among the three union 
confederations were eased, and this political rapprochement (Baccaro et al. 2003: 47–
48) favoured the resumption of centralised bargaining and social pacts. 
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The second important difference in the two employment relations systems relates to 
the institutional legacies in employers’ associations. In Italy, Confindustria was 
traditionally the employer representative of the private sector, whereas Intersind was 
the employer representative of the public sector. Intersind was set up in 1958 so that it 
represents state-owned (IRI) firms in labour relations and its membership came from 
various economic sectors such as: metalworking, construction, food processing, 
communications, broadcasting, and transport. Following a political agreement in May 
1994 between Romano Prodi (president of the IRI Group), Luigi Abete (president of 
Confindustria), and Agostino Paci (president of Intersind), Confindustria absorbed 
Intersind (EIRR, 1994; Negrelli, 1998). In sharp contrast, there was no equivalent 
employers association for public sector enterprises in Greece. The employers’ 
associations were organised only in the private sector: SEV (Hellenic Federation of 
Enterprises) traditionally represented big industrial firms, GSEVEE (Hellenic 
Confederation of Artisans) represented small-medium artisan firms, and ESEE 
(National Confederation of Greek Commerce) represented small-medium commercial 
firms. Collective bargaining was typical in public sector enterprises, but managers 
acted as representatives of the employers’ side and held the negotiations. When the 
public sector enterprises changed ownership status, the private sector associations did 
not fill the representation gap. 
 
4.2. The context of employment relations in Italian and Greek 
Telecommunications 
In both the Italian and Greek telecommunications sectors, collective bargaining was 
an established practice at the company-level, due to the monopoly structure of the 
industry (Negrelli 1996; Zambarloukou 2010). The three major con-federal unions 
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have been active in Telecom Italia: FILPT-CGIL (Federazione Italiana Lavoratori 
Poste e Telecomunicazioni), SILT-CISL (Sindacato Italiano Lavoratori Telefonici 
Stato), and UILTE-UIL (Unione Italiana Lavoratori Telefonici). The Telecom Italia 
unions accepted several compromises with regard to flexibility and technological 
change in company-level agreements in the early 1990s, thus preparing the ground for 
Telecom Italia’s privatization (Negrelli 1996).  
 
More specifically, the major challenge in the 1990s was how to downsize and 
restructure Telecom Italia, and thereby, make its privatization easier. The negotiations 
between the state-employer association (Intersind) and the three TI unions were 
lengthy, but resulted in the 1995 agreement. The latter provided that restructuring 
would take place through voluntary redundancies, while it introduced four types of 
flexibility: teleworking, geographical mobility, part-time working, and franchising. 
Teleworking was especially facilitated by technological advances and would help 
alleviate the problem of having some overstaffed divisions, while other divisions were 
understaffed. Incentives for geographical mobility complemented this measure, 
providing bonuses for workers assigned to other workplaces on the basis of company 
needs or taking the option to shift into part-time contracts. Finally, a very innovative 
measure was to transform some of the former employees into entrepreneurs, by 
offering them the opportunity to open a franchised shop selling Telecom Italia 
products. In the 1996 negotiations the employers’ side pushed for further introduction 
of flexibility in work organization, on the basis that ‘competition in the telecom 
market means that existing “privileges” are no longer affordable’ (EIRR, 1996). The 
deal reached between Intersind and the telecoms unions included a revision of the 
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grading system towards flatter management hierarchies, working time flexibility, and 
forms of teleworking for different staff grades (EIRR, 1996).  
 
The reorganization of work towards greater flexibility did not only take place inside 
the privatized Telecom Italia, but also within the new entrants. Infostrada, which was 
Telecom Italia’s main competitor, introduced several types of flexibilities. In the 1998 
company agreement Infostrada agreed with the metalworkers’ unions (FIOM-CGIL, 
FIM-CISL and UILM-UIL) on a plan to recruit about 1300 workers for its call 
centres. The two sides agreed on a high degree of flexibility, including fixed-term 
part-time contracts, apprenticeship/work-entry contracts, incentive and performance 
related-pay, minimum service during strikes, Sunday working and operation of the 
24/7 shift system (Pedersini, 1998). The agreement was received with satisfaction 
from the unions’ side, despite the increased levels of flexibility. 
 
Following the opening up of the sector to competition, the three Telecom Italia unions 
broadened the remit of representation by merging with other unions and transforming 
into sector-level associations. In 1997 CGIL’s affiliate union FILPT changed its name 
into SLC (Sindacato Lavoratori Comunicazione) and merged with the separate postal 
union and the information/broadcasting union. CISL’s affiliate union SILT was also 
renamed FISTEL (Federazione Sindacale della Informazione dello Spettacolo e delle 
Telecomunicazioni), covering also employees in the telecommunications, IT and 
broadcasting sectors. Similarly, UIL’s affiliate UILTE was renamed UILCOM 
(Unione Italiana Lavoratori Comunicazione). Thus, the representation of ‘outsiders’ 
in new competitors emerged through a top-down process, as the sectoral unions 
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sought to recruit members in new competitors and limit the use of fixed-term and 
temporary agency workers throughout the company (see section 5.2 below). 
 
In the Greek telecommunications sector, OME-OTE (Federation of Employees in 
OTE) was established in 1982 as an enterprise union and affiliated to the peak-level 
GSEE. It represented all OTE employees with permanent employment relationships 
and regularly negotiated biennial company agreements (Zambarloukou 2010). Union 
factionalism along ideological lines was present in OME-OTE. Because of its 
erstwhile status as a public sector enterprise, employees in the company retained 
‘permanency’, a life-course tenure similar to the one held by civil servants 
(Christopoulou and Monastiriotis 2014). Although the privatization process gradually 
altered the company’s ownership status, this job protection remained for core 
employees, and the company froze its recruitment on open-ended contracts. Instead, 
all new hires in OTE and other subsidiaries (e.g. in the printing and call-centre 
subsidiaries Infote and OTEplus) relied heavily on recruitment through fixed-term 
contracts, subcontracting and agency staff. Until the mid-2000s OME-OTE unionists 
were successful in defending this job-for-life tenure, but at the same time, a peripheral 
workforce developed rapidly in the sector. This process resulted in a pattern of 
extreme labour market dualization between insiders in OTE and outsiders in new 
competitors. 
 
The representation of ‘outsiders’ in Greek telecommunications emerged through a 
bottom-up process. In 2005 a group of employees managed to set up a company-level 
union in WIND Greece (PASE-TIM/WIND - Pan-Hellenic Union of TIM/WIND 
Employees), and subsequently unions were established in mobile telephony Vodafone 
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(PASE-Vodafone - Pan-Hellenic Union of Vodafone Employees) as well as in fixed 
telephony company Forthnet. Additionally, employees with spurious self-employment 
contracts (blokaki) in the informatics and telecommunications sector had organised 
themselves around a sectoral-occupational union, the SMT (Union of Waged 
Technicians). 
 
The representation of telecommunications firms in business associations also evolved 
differently. Federcomin (Federazione delle Imprese delle Comunicazioni e dell’ 
Informatica) was established in Italy in 1998 and absorbed some of the personnel and 
functions in Intersind. While new telecommunications firms in the sector became 
members of Federcomin, the association lacked the legal competence to negotiate 
wage agreements with trade unions. Federcomin became the federation representing 
‘network services’ i.e. telecommunications, transport, road communication, and 
broadcasting. This incorporation was seen as a necessary step in the large-scale 
privatization process that was taking place in Italy; it re-affirmed the government’s 
resolve to proceed with privatization, but also helped to expand Confindustria’s 
membership and influence into services sectors, which were up until then dominated 
by state ownership (EIRR, 1994). The most important implication of this change was 
that Confindustria was able to bargain on behalf of its telecom members from the 
start, even though there was no sectoral association. As we shall see in the next 
section, Confindustria finally established the first telecom employer association 
ASSTEL (Assotelecommunicazioni) on 29 November 2002 conferring the legal 
competence to represent members in labour relations issues. 
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In contrast, there was no employers’ association to represent firms in Greek 
telecommunications (Kretsos, 2007). The first business association in the sector was 
SEPE (Federation of Hellenic Information Technology & Communications 
Enterprises), which was established in 1995, and aimed at influencing the 
technological and regulatory aspects of the market. The majority of firms that 
constituted the founding members came from the information technology sector. By 
the early 2000s, OTE and the large fixed and mobile telephony companies became 
members of SEPE. Despite the enlargement of membership to include 
telecommunications companies, the logic of interest representation that was enshrined 
in the association’s statute remained narrow, focused on lobbying for regulatory and 
technological issues. The full opening up of the market in 2001 and the entry of new 
competitors triggered the creation of another business association, SATPE (Greek 
Licensed Telecommunication Providers Association), which was established in 2003. 
This association was the initiative of the smaller telecommunications operators, which 
were given licences to offer fixed-telephony services over OTE’s last mile of the 
network. The association’s main function was to represent the interests of its members 
in the implementation of European Union regulation with regard to liberalization and 
acted mainly as a lobbying group vis-à-vis the national regulator, EETT. 
 
5. Liberalization and Collective Bargaining in Telecommunications 
5.1. Common Pressures: Liberalization and Privatization 
The liberalization process allowed the entrance of new competitors in both Italian and 
Greek markets. The first company to compete with Telecom Italia in the fixed 
network was Albacom, which was established in 1995 and was later acquired by BT 
Italia. In 1998 the Olivetti Group established the fixed telephony subsidiary, 
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Infostrada, which was acquired by Wind two years later, when Olivetti took over 
control of Telecom Italia through a hostile takeover. Finally, Teletu was established in 
1999 and was acquired by Vodafone in 2010. The sector’s independent regulator, 
AGCOM, steered the competitive pressures in the market. It followed a rather 
restrictive tariff policy for Telecom Italia, allowing new entrants to compete for 
services using the ‘last mile’ of the fixed network infrastructure, and preventing 
Telecom Italia from abusing its dominant position (Sacripanti 1999). The regulatory 
impact contributed to a rapid decline in Telecom Italia’s market share, dropping from 
100 per cent in 1997 to 65 per cent in 2008 (European Commission 2000; European 
Commission 2009). 
 
The intensification of competition is similarly observed in the fixed-telephony 
segment of the Greek market; however, with some delay. The Greek government 
managed to negotiate a three-year extension with the European Commission, and full 
liberalization was completed in 2001. The independent regulator, EETT, afforded the 
new players to erode OTE’s monopoly position and the policy sought to prevent OTE 
from applying a price squeeze upon its competitors (Pagoulatos and Zahariadis 2011: 
18). The Greek electricity company entered the fixed telephony market via Tellas, in a 
consortium with the Italian WIND. Additionally, two major Internet service providers 
(Forthnet and HellasOnLine) took advantage of their infrastructure to offer fixed 
telephony services. Several other new start-up companies (e.g. Lannet, Telepassport, 
Teledome, Altec Telecoms, and Vivodi) entered the market. Thus, OTE suffered a 
steady decline in its market share, from 100 per cent in 1997 to 71 per cent in 2008 
(European Commission 2000; European Commission 2009). The business strategy of 
the new firms was very much focused on low-cost products and services, leading to a 
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situation of ‘cut-throat competition’ in the product market. Although the new 
subscribers’ base expanded rapidly, the price wars in conjunction with the cash-flow 
problems pushed many firms out of the market. By the late 2000s the smaller 
providers merged (e.g. Vivodi with OnTelecoms) or made strategic alliances with 
larger firms (e.g. ‘Hellas On Line’ with Vodafone) so that they survive the intense 
competition (Kathimerini, 2006; 2009). 
 
Although the Commission’s liberalization agenda was responsible for opening up the 
markets, the privatization of the incumbents was on the agenda of governments in 
Italy and Greece. The consensus on privatization was based on the common goal of 
raising funds so as to reduce the national debt (Thatcher 2007: 195). Private investors 
took over control of Telecom Italia in 1997 under Romano Prodi’s centre-left 
coalition government (Florio 2007: 3). By 2003 Telecom Italia was fully privatized 
(Doellgast et al. 2013: 8). The privatisation of OTE was completed in 2008, when 
Deutsche Telekom acquired 25 per cent of OTE and agreed with the Greek 
government the right to appoint the CEO. The acquisition of OTE by DT was 
exceptionally controversial, as it was engineered by the Greek government so as to 
avoid a hostile takeover (see Anonymous). By 2012, the share of DT increased to 40 
per cent, while state ownership was brought down to 10 per cent.  
 
Overall, both Italian and Greek telecommunications sectors faced similar changes 
since the mid-1990s. The sectors opened up to competition due to the European 
liberalization requirements; and the ex-monopolies went through the process of 
privatization. In both cases this resulted in intense competitive pressures and labour 
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market segmentation. Nevertheless, the institutional paths in collective bargaining 
diverged significantly. 
 
5.2. The Success of Bargaining Centralization in Italian Telecommunications 
The competitive pressures unleashed after liberalization and privatization led to a 
requirement of restructuring and downsizing through redundancies in the incumbent 
Telecom Italia. In negotiations over downsizing in 1995, the employers’ side argued 
that the changing market context and particularly ‘competition in the telecom market’ 
necessitated radical changes (EIRR, 1996). Although the trade unions accepted the 
inevitability of liberalization and privatization, they shared a common strategic 
objective for the sector: to centralise bargaining via a single sectoral contract. 
 
The unionists from all three confederations in Telecom Italia were resolved to use the 
incumbent’s wage agreement as the foundation for a single contract in the sector and 
extend it to new operators (La Stampa, 1996). As one informant noted: 
‘The three confederations shared the strategy of extending the Telecom Italia contract across the 
sector.’ (Interview, SLC-CGIL unionist 9, 25/11/10) 
Nevertheless, this strategic choice alone was not enough to lead to the centralization 
of bargaining, and this institutional change was neither easy nor straightforward. 
Following the liberalization of the market, the bargaining arrangements across the 
sector appeared fragmented. Telecom Italia had a rather generous wage agreement 
that covered employees across the group; Infostrada applied the less generous 
metalworking sector agreement; Wind applied a special agreement; and finally, other 
smaller companies were not bound by any agreement (Pedersini, 2000). The three 
Italian labour confederations’ (CGIL, CISL, and UIL) shared the fear that: 
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‘…the combination of multiple bargaining arrangements with high competitive pressures would 
lead to a ‘race-to-bottom’ for working conditions (Interview, CISL unionist 3, 25/5/10). 
The fragmentation in bargaining arrangements reflected partly past union structures 
that inhibited the centralization of bargaining, similar to cases like German 
telecommunications (Doellgast et al. 2009). Indeed, new firms in Italian 
telecommunications emerged from the manufacturing (Olivetti) and electricity 
(ENEL) sectors. Thus, the metalworkers’ unions organized the employees in 
Infostrada and Omnitel (later Vodafone) and the electricity’s unions organized the 
employees in WIND. Still, an important difference with cases like Germany is that 
even in the new competitors, the unions were part of unitary workplace structures 
known as RSUs (Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria). Indeed, as an informant noted: 
‘The RSUs were established in all new enterprises, such as WIND and Vodafone, and they 
elected representatives of all workers without exclusion’ (Interview, SLC-CGIL unionist 9, 
25/11/10). 
RSUs were a novel institutional structure, which was devised in the July 1993 
Accord, and provided that two thirds of their members would come from direct 
elections among employees, while one third would be appointed by the con-federal 
unions. This institutional structure appeared extremely important, because it ensured 
that any ideological or organizational differences would not get in the way of unitary 
representation in new firms. In addition, the three con-federal unions (CGIL, CISL 
and UIL) resolved jurisdictional issues through consultations, and the new sectoral 
telecommunications unions took over representation from metalworker and electricity 
unions. Finally, the con-federal unionists engaged into organizing campaigns in firms 
where there was no union active. As one informant noted: 
‘In the new enterprises in which there was no RSU previously, we visited the different 
workplaces and asked the workers to become members of our union’. (Interview, SLC-CGIL 
unionist 9, 25/11/10) 
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Overall, the strategic choice of unions to centralize bargaining was combined with 
organizing campaigns, restructuring existing union structures and tapping into the 
unitary workplace structures of RSUs. As mentioned above, the initial strategy of the 
TI trade unions was to put pressure for the extension of the Telecom Italia agreement 
across the sector, but this proved to be too ambitious. As one informant noted: 
‘The new enterprises did not want the extension of the TI contract…For Telecom Italia the key 
challenge was to safeguard industrial peace during redundancies…For the new enterprises the 
key concern was to increase employment…’ (Interview, SLC-CGIL unionist 9, 25/11/10) 
Nonetheless, increasing employment while applying the Telecom Italia wage 
structures was very costly and the new competitors refused the extension of the TI 
contract. Instead, smaller firms voiced their preference for decentralized firm level 
bargaining (Paparella, 2000). The divisions in the employers’ camp were stark. 
Telecom Italia and the other main players (such as Vodafone and Wind) wanted a 
contract, but the new competitors were unwilling to pay the generous terms that 
Telecom Italia could afford, whereas the smaller firms did not want a sectoral contract 
at all. 
 
Faced with these divisions, the unions’ strategy was to focus their pressure on two 
fronts: Telecom Italia and the peak-level business association Confindustria. Telecom 
Italia was the larger employer, whereas Confindustria had the legal competence to 
represent member firms on the bargaining table due to its earlier agreement to absorb 
Intersind. In one important tactical move, the sectoral unions refused to negotiate a 
new company agreement with Telecom Italia, unless collective bargaining was first 
centralized covering all employees in the sector (La Republica, 1999). The unions 
pursued meetings with the CEO of Telecom Italia, to pull the strings in Confindustria 
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and other firms. Indeed, after meeting with the trade unions in July 1999, the CEO of 
Telecom Italia, Roberto Colaninno, agreed to help the unions to get a single contract 
in the industry. Colaninno characterized this choice as ‘essential and decisive’ adding 
that: ‘I am ready to personally sit at the bargaining table. I fully agree with the unions; 
it remains to overcome plenty of resistance from various interested companies’ (La 
Stampa, 1999). 
 
Although union pressure was effective in getting consent from the larger employer, 
there was still resistance from smaller firms. This suggests that although firms were 
faced with union pressures, this could not lead automatically to the centralization of 
bargaining. Instead, Confindustria played an important role in balancing out the 
diverse business interests. The employers association recognized that there was a 
deadlock that had to be overcome. As an employer representative noted: 
‘…the simultaneous application of different wage agreements in the sector created conditions of 
unfair competition [emphasis added] and Confindustria had to act upon this (Interview, 
ASSTEL representative 3, 22/11/10) 
Admittedly, Telecom Italia suffered the most from this ‘unfair competition’, as the 
new competitors enjoyed a more flexible cost structure. Standardizing the wage costs 
across the industry would release some of the pressure on Telecom Italia, but there 
was the prospect of inhibiting the flexibility that smaller firms required. In the process 
of intermediating the interests of large and small firms, Confindustria’s overarching 
role was to strike an acceptable compromise with the unions and then convince firms 
to comply with it. This compromise took the form of the first sectoral agreement, 
which was unusually signed by peak-level associations. A business informant 
summarises the motives of employers in consenting to such an agreement: 
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‘…the agreed minimum wages accommodated the new and smaller companies in the sector, 
which could also benefit from social peace’ (Interview, ASSTEL representative 3, 22/11/10). 
 
The first sectoral agreement for the telecommunications sector was signed on 28 June 
2000 between the three con-federal unions (CIGL, CISL, UIL) and Confindustria 
(EIRR, 2000a). It provided for minimum wages and conditions across the sector, and 
a component of ‘negotiated flexibility’ (La Stampa, 2000; La Repubblica, 2000). The 
compromise involved an increase in flexibility, in exchange for training and reduction 
of total working time. The increase in flexibility was dubbed as ‘just-in-time working’ 
(flessibilità tempestiva) (EIRR, 2000a). Management could request from labour 
representatives - at a very short notice (48 hours) – to alter working time schedules so 
as to meet increased needs during busy periods. The agreement also regulated the 
extent of atypical employment in the sector. The firms were allowed to hire 
employees up to 15 per cent on fixed-term contracts and up to 15 per cent agency 
staff; in total, no more than 30 per cent of the overall workforce in the South of Italy 
(Mezzogiorno). In Central and Northern Italy, the limits were up to 13 per cent for 
each group, and in total no more than 26 per cent of the workforce (Paparella, 2000; 
EIRR, 2000a). A further increase might be permissible, but it had to be agreed 
through company level bargaining. The atypical contracts were allowed to deal with 
skills and labour shortages during periods of holidays, training leaves, busy times or 
peaks of activity due to new orders or to the launch of a new product. In other words, 
flexibility was instrumentally used to meet fluctuations in demand. Finally, the 
agreement provided for the operation of job-sharing. For both unions and employers 
the common ground was to ensure ‘fair competition’ in the sector. As one of the key 
trade union negotiators noted: 
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‘The telecommunications market was liberalized and the competition was intense because of the 
new entrants. The new firms increasingly acquired market shares ‘crashing’ Telecom Italia. 
Therefore, the aim of the contract between Confindustria and us was to ensure fair competition 
and refocus competition on services quality and prices, rather than on wages.’ (Interview, CISL 
unionist 3, 25/5/10) 
The unions appeared pragmatic in accepting some flexibility in employment practices, 
since their priority was to increase employment levels and bargaining coverage for the 
whole sector whilst avoiding a race to bottom in wages. Telecom Italia employees 
retained higher wages in their company contract, but the sectoral unions ensured 
increased bargaining coverage. In the enterprise agreements of Telecom Italia, 
downsizing was agreed with the aid of a variety of instruments, including mobility 
procedures linked with ordinary ‘wage guarantee funds’ (cassa integrazionne 
guadagni) replacing part of the salary for those close to retirement (EIRR, 2000b; 
Pedersini, 2002). Overall, the three con-federal unions were united on the basis of 
representing the interests of employees in the sector, rather than core members in 
Telecom Italia. The historical ideological differences between con-federal unions 
were put aside and as one labour informant noted: 
‘…when we are talking at the sectoral level, it’s easier to reach an agreement…We respect each 
other’s differences, organizational and ideological, and there is no hegemonic union. Although 
organizational unity is not easy, the unity is practical, unità operativa’ (Interview, CISL unionist 
3, 25/5/10) 
 
Nevertheless, this one-off sectoral agreement between the three con-federal unions 
and Confindustria would not last for long, unless sectoral associations were 
established on both sides to ensure compliance. Confindustria took the initiative to 
organize telecommunications companies around a new employers’ association 
(ASSTEL), which was founded in November 2002 (Muratore, 2007). The smaller 
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firms were convinced to become members of the association, to avoid the prospect of 
continuous judicial disputes. Indeed, as one business informant remarked: 
‘…their organized employees could go to the Italian courts and ask for comparable wages with 
those in Telecom Italia. In light of this prospect, all telecom firms joined the association. 
(Interview, ASSTEL representative 3, 22/11/10) 
The decision-making processes in ASSTEL took into account both Telecom Italia’s 
and new competitors’ interests. The association was not dominated by the ex 
monopoly Telecom Italia, and the president came from one of the new firms (initially 
FASTWEB, and afterwards Vodafone), balancing the different regulatory interests of 
Telecom Italia and the new competitors. 
 
On 3 December 2005, the three sectoral unions and ASSTEL signed another sectoral 
agreement, thus, solidifying the centralization of collective bargaining (Della Torre, 
2006). The membership of ASSTEL was enlarged to cover several firms in the 
information and technology sector. The permitted level of employment on atypical 
contracts was also regulated as in the previous agreement. In the face of this, even the 
Minister of Welfare of the centre-right Berlusconi government, Roberto Maroni, 
expressed regret at the ‘desire of the parties to reduce flexibility’ (Della Torre, 2006). 
As the key informant explained: 
‘For Telecom Italia the key challenge continued to be the downsizing of the company through 
different types of ‘social shock absorbers’. For the new enterprises the key concern was to 
stabilize employment and reduce labour turnover’ (Interview, SLC-CGIL unionist 9, 25/11/10) 
 
Dualization was further averted when the ‘outsiders’ (call-centre employees) were 
also included in the sectoral agreement. The unions reached a deal with the call-centre 
companies in December 2006, agreeing to convert existing ‘freelance contracts’ into 
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open-ended employment contracts for 6,500 employees (Santi, 2007). The result was 
that 97 per cent of employees in the main call-centre provider (Almaviva Group) 
would be recruited on the basis of an open-ended employment contract. Even more 
importantly, the call-centre companies were compelled to join ASSTEL and thereby, 
all workers would be covered by the telecom’ agreement provisions. Overall, labour 
market dualization was tempered as the trade unions and employers extended 
coverage to employees in new competitors and call-centres. 
 
5.3. The Failure of Bargaining Centralization in Greek Telecommunications 
In contrast to the Italian case, the effort to centralize bargaining in Greece was marked 
by failure, and decentralized bargaining continued to be the norm. OME-OTE was 
clearly the stronger trade union capable of leading a similar campaign to that of 
Italian telecommunications unions. But the unionists in OTE kept this item very low 
in their agenda, and their strategic choice was to focus on enterprise bargaining. 
OME-OTE followed an enterprise-bargaining approach signing company agreements 
with OTE’s management (Zambarloukou 2010: 244). The agreements in the 2000s 
incrementally negotiated the terms of internal restructuring and ensured downsizing 
through voluntary early retirement schemes (To Vima, 2005). Additionally, unionists 
in OME-OTE were very much focused on disputes with the independent regulator 
(EEET) trying to stall liberalization (Pagoulatos and Zahariadis 2011), even 
organizing protests against the regulatory authority. 
 
It was not until February 2006 that the demand for centralization of bargaining 
appeared in the agenda of the OTE union. The bargaining platform, finalized by the 
Executive Council of OME-OTE, included no less than 56 items, including the 
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demand to centralize bargaining with an industry-wide agreement covering all firms 
in the sector (OME-OTE, 2006). OME-OTE sent the bargaining platform only to 
OTE’s management and the Ministry of Labour, reflecting the past bargaining norms. 
Hence, there was nobody on the other side to bargain for new competitors in the 
sector and the union did not have a clear strategy of how to pursue this demand. This 
indicates the importance of past bargaining structures, and contrasts sharply with the 
strategy followed by the Italian telecommunications unions, which not only 
threatened to exit the bargaining table with Telecom Italia, but also put pressure on 
the peak business association Confindustria. 
 
The lack of resolve on the part of OME-OTE is also evidenced by the fact that there 
was no prior consultation with other telecommunications unions in the sector, as, for 
example, the new firm level union in WIND. More generally, the communication 
channels between OTE unionists and employees in new telecommunications firms 
broke down due to ideological cleavages. Despite the fact that OME-OTE amended 
its statute so that it is able to accept other organizations as members: 
‘…it did require from prospective member associations to have at least 500 members in order to 
become an affiliate union (Interview, OME-OTE unionist 11, 27/04/11). 
In fact, the only telecommunications union that was eligible to become a member was 
the socialist union in Cosmote, the mobile telephony arm of OTE.  
 
As a result, the gap in employees’ representation was filled ‘bottom-up’ with grass-
roots unionization. Apart from the company union in WIND (PASE-TIM/WIND), 
employees established company trade unions in mobile telephony Vodafone (PASE-
Vodafone), as well as in fixed telephony company Forthnet. Company agreements 
were eventually agreed in both cases. As an informant noted: 
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‘…we managed to have a company contract without any help from the largest union in the 
sector, and in the context of an anti-union climate from the side of the management’ (Interview, 
WIND unionist 13, 2/5/11).  
The only initiative to centralize bargaining came from a rather small occupational 
union (SMT). SMT was established in 1999 with the aim of representing and 
organising engineers and technicians working in the information and communication 
technology sector. SMT was resolved to push for bargaining centralization, and held 
prior consultations with representatives from other telecommunications firms (Wind, 
Forthnet, and Vodafone). As a key informant suggested: 
‘…we carried out a brief study to support the demand for a sectoral agreement. After a period of 
fertilization and consultation with colleagues in new telecom firms, we sent an invitation in 
2008 to SEPE to start negotiations for a national telecommunications contract (Interview, SMT 
unionist 12, 2/5/11). 
SEPE was one of the two business associations in the sector and responded with a 
rejection of this demand. As explained in the previous section, SEPE had a diverse 
membership, including information and communication technology sector firms, and 
was focused on regulatory issues, essentially acting as a ‘trade association’. As a 
business informant noted: 
‘We were unable to respond to the demand to initiate discussions for a sectoral agreement, 
because our statute did not confer us with that power’ (Interview, SEPE representative 5, 
30/8/11). 
 
Thus, failed centralization is not only explained by past bargaining structures and 
OME-OTE’s strategic choice to focus on enterprise bargaining, but also by the 
absence of employer associability. Although the sector’s companies were organized 
into two business associations SEPE and SATPE, none of them possessed the legal 
competence to negotiate labour relations issues for its members.  
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This outcome might raise the question: why OME-OTE did not support SMT in 
pursuing a demand for centralization? The question is legitimate, given that 
centralization was part of OME-OTE’s bargaining platform two years earlier. The 
explanation lies in the ideological cleavages between OME-OTE unionists and 
unionists in new competitors, including SMT. Only a minority within OME-OTE was 
really keen on centralization of bargaining. As an informant observed: 
‘…the only reason why this demand appeared as one of the items in the platform, was to 
appease the smaller leftist political factions within OME-OTE’ (Interview, OME-OTE unionist 
11, 27/04/11).  
OME-OTE has been a stronghold of the centre-left (PASKE) and centre-right 
(DAKE) factions, which jointly controlled 10 out of 13 seats in the Executive 
Committee and 17 out of 22 seats in the Administrative Board. Reflecting this balance 
of power, the president of OME-OTE was customarily coming from the socialist 
PASKE, while the general secretary from the centre-right DAKE. Additionally, 
OME-OTE had closer ties and shared interests with other public sector unions (in 
postal sector, electricity, railways, etc.), rather than with the new unions of ‘outsiders’ 
in the telecommunications sector. 
 
In conclusion, the deeper reasons that militated against a more sectoral approach are 
traced to the ideological cleavages between the insiders in OME-OTE and outsiders in 
new competitors. Extending membership to include outsiders could be threatening for 
OME-OTE’s established political factions. In other words, the unionists in OME-OTE 
perceived the employees in new competitors along an ideological template of ‘us-and-
them’. Knowing that the majority of employees in new competitors were either 
militants leftist or apolitical, accepting them as members would upset the internal 
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political balance in the union. As the dualization literature predicts, conserving those 
narrow organizational interests intensified the cleavages between insiders and 
outsiders in the sectoral labour market (Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013). 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This article set out to answer the question: under what conditions are unions and 
employers able to overcome their differences in interests, and form the coalitions 
necessary to establish centralized bargaining? Much of the literature on institutional 
change in advanced market economies has focused on bargaining decentralization in 
established industries, and on dualization and centralization through social pacts. 
Even so, there are many new industries in these countries that did not have sectoral 
bargaining structures, where unions could potentially build these structures.  
 
Existing literature on dualization has emphasized insider unions’ choice to protect 
their core members (Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013; Hassel 2014; Palier and 
Thelen 2010) or the difficulties that past union and collective bargaining structures 
posed for them in extending their representation domain (Doellgast 2009; Holst 
2014). Both Italian and Greek sectors had strong insider unions interested in 
protecting their core members, and past bargaining structures focused on enterprise 
bargaining. Nevertheless, competing unions in Italy appeared able to centralize 
bargaining and include outsiders, whereas the unitary union in Greek 
telecommunications accepted dualization, exacerbating the insider-outsider cleavage. 
 
Additionally, past research has examined the role of the state either in steering neo-
corporatist revival through social pacts (Avdagic 2010; Baccaro and Lim 2007; 
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Hamann and Kelly 2007) or in extending centralized collective agreements to new 
industry entrants (Doellgast et al. 2009)(Anonymous). The Greek and Italian 
governments were keen on restructuring their incumbents and make them ‘fit’ for 
privatization and liberalization, but there was no evidence that the role of the state 
was important in the centralization of bargaining. In fact, the Italian Minister of 
Labour was negative on the inclusion of outsider call-centre workers in the sectoral 
agreement.  
 
Finally, centralization through social pacts has been attributed to moderate union 
leadership (Baccaro and Lim 2007). However, moderate union leadership appeared to 
be present in both incumbents’ unions, as both OME-OTE and Telecom Italia unions 
made concessions to facilitate the incumbents’ downsizing as part of their enterprise 
collective agreements. Overall, these insights appear unable to fully explain the 
different strategic choices of unions and the diverse outcomes in the two cases. The 
evidence from the case studies suggested that the different outcomes are not only 
explained by past union and collective bargaining structures, but also by the role of 
ideology in unions’ strategic choices and the legacies of employers’ associability. 
 
Italian unionists appeared able to collaborate and carve out joint strategies without 
letting historical ideological differences to get on the way. This behaviour is traced 
back to the different evolution in the relationship between trade unions and political 
parties since the early 1990s (after Tangentopoli). Unlike their Greek counterparts, the 
Italian unions distanced themselves from traditional political parties and there was no 
clear alignment between the new political parties and the union confederations. As far 
as their motives are concerned they sought to protect employees at large (and not just 
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their core members) from a ‘race to bottom’ in wages; or to ease out the social costs 
of adjustment to business restructuring with ‘social shock absorbers’ (cassa 
integrazionne). In the sectoral agreement, they sought to regulate the extent of 
atypical contracts, thus tempering the extent of dualization. Finally, the unitary 
workplace structures (RSUs) in new competitors were influential in extending 
coverage to call-centre employees. This institution supported overcoming cleavages 
in Italy, but there was a lack of this same institutional structure in Greece. 
 
The other part of the answer lies in the institutional and legal differences as regards 
employer associability in Italy and Greece, which is rather downplayed in existing 
literature. A fundamental difference in the two cases is that the Italian employers’ 
associations could bargain from the start on behalf of their members. Confindustria 
was critical in intermediating the different regulatory interests between the incumbent 
and new competitors/smaller firms. Admittedly, employers’ associability in Italy 
might appear as a function of unions’ pressure. But this stumbles upon the collective 
action problem (Olson 1971). Given different regulatory interests, employers should 
not be expected to associate automatically when faced with union pressures. Instead, 
the historical perspective suggests that the ability of employers to protect their 
collective interests (Schmitter and Streeck 2011) in the Italian case can be traced back 
to a legacy of employer associability in the public sector through Intersind. Thus, the 
diverse business interests of new competitors and the incumbent were reconciled on 
the common ground of pursuing ‘fair competition’ via centralization of bargaining. 
 
In Greek telecommunications, the path is more similar to that predicted by dualization 
theorists, and suggests the importance of past bargaining norms and union structures 
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(Doellgast et al. 2009). Enterprise-focused bargaining in ex-public sector enterprises 
survived after liberalization. Additionally, the absence of employer associability is 
evident in the Greek case. The existing business associations were segmented along 
the large firms vs. small firms axis and also focused on narrow regulatory issues. 
SEPE represented big telecommunications providers, whereas SATPE represented 
smaller telecommunications firms. Thus, the prospect of having an association able to 
intermediate effectively the interests of both small and large firms, as the Italian 
ASSTEL, was unlikely. This resulted in a product market environment characterised 
by price wars and ‘cut-throat competition’. 
 
In conclusion, the case studies suggest the importance of cooperation on both 
employer and union side to building encompassing institutions. However, that 
cooperation was never taken for granted, it was constantly contested and renegotiated 
through an interplay of institutional path dependencies and actors’ strategic choices. 
The Greek case is one characterized by both divided employers and unions (with 
cleavages persisting over time); while the Italian case shows how both groups can 
start out as being more divided, but overcome this. The article also suggests the 
generalizable institutional conditions facilitating (or hindering) that cooperation: 
namely, the interplay between different strategic choices of unions and legacies in 
employer associability. These conditions explain divergent paths of inclusive 
bargaining versus dualization. In the Italian telecommunications sector the unions 
shaped the new environment by extending coverage and inclusion of outsiders, thus, 
tempering dualization. The maintenance of labour unity is traced back to the political 
rapprochement of con-federal unions, whereas employer associability is traced back 
to Intersind’s incorporation by Confindustria. By contrast, in the Greek 
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telecommunications sector, the unions were divided along ideological cleavages and 
this hindered a coordinated sectoral approach, whereas employers were segmented 
along narrow business associations. These cleavages on either side provided limited 
motivation to centralize bargaining, and intensified the labour market dualization 
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